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Intention in the Law of Property
THE LAW OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

John V. Orth

I

NTENTION IS A PERVASIVE concept in
the law. Torts are traditionally divided
into intentional and unintentional torts,
although the meaning of the distinguishing
characteristic requires some explanation;
beginning law students are routinely baﬄed
to discover that they can commit the “intentional” tort of trespass by entering land in
the innocent but mistaken belief that they
have a right to be there. Intention is also an
essential element of criminal law, although
it too requires some explanation; “malice
aforethought” does not demand quite the
amount of time or mental eﬀort that one
might think. Contract is probably the legal
discipline in which intention is most prominent; agreement is of the essence of contract,

but the “meeting of the minds” is a legal, not
a psychological, concept. “The law has nothing to do with the actual state of the parties’
minds,” Oliver Wendell Holmes reminded
his audience: “In contract, as elsewhere, it
must go by externals, and judge parties by
their conduct.”¹
Property law, too, must concern itself
with intention, although it is generally more
involved with the rights and responsibilities
of ownership. Intention enters the law of
property primarily when transfers of title are
contemplated, particularly sales or gifts.² The
sale of property is a matter of agreement and
would properly be treated as part of contract
law except that as to real property special
doctrines are involved and a deed is required

John V. Orth is the William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill.
 O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 242 (88).
2 Intention is also an element in the acquisition of personal property by ﬁnding and of real property by
adverse possession, but these involve relatively small amounts of property. Unintentional deprivations
of title occur in cases of forfeiture and loss of title to adverse possessors; inheritance and escheat operate
as unintentional gratuitous transfers. Condemnation, or the taking of property by the power of eminent domain, is an unintentional transfer for value (a forced sale) to the sovereign. As conceptualized
ever since Blackstone, “[a]ll that the legislature does [in the exercise of the power of eminent domain] is
to oblige the owner to alienate his possessions for a reasonable price,” substituting one form of property
for another. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 35 (765).
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to consummate the transaction.³ Intention is still legal rules, other than the criminal law,
a necessary element of the law of gifts. Every that are designed to frustrate it. Property law,
law student learns that the requisites of an in a sense the oldest part of the common law,
inter vivos gift are intention, delivery, and ac- remains the province of archaic and often inceptance.⁴ Testamentary gifts are more com- tention-defeating rules.⁸
plicated: the requisite intention, the animus
“[W]e sit here,” explained an inﬂuential
testandi, must be expressed in certain stereo- English judge in an important wills case, “not
typed ways, usually in a writing, signed by to try what the Testator may have intended,
the testator and attested by two witnesses.⁵
but to ascertain, on legal principles, what
Intention was not always the lodestar in testamentary instruments he has made.”⁹ Or,
the law that it is today. As Professor Patrick putting it the other way around, in the words
Atiyah has reminded us, for much of the of a still earlier English judge, “after you have
history of the common law, “giving eﬀect to ﬁxed the intention, it then becomes a quesintentions” was not “the primary objective tion, whether such intention can be executed
of the social order or of the law,”⁶ but since consistently with the established rules of law.”¹⁰
the time of Lord Mansﬁeld at the end of The Rule in Shelley’s Case, where it still exthe eighteenth century, the steady triumph ists, means that a grant of a life estate to A
of individualism has reoriented many legal followed by a remainder in fee simple to A’s
doctrines. In the modern world the biblical heirs will be construed to convey the entire
question, “Is it not lawful for me to do what I estate to A without regard to the grantor’s
will with mine own?”⁷ is generally considered intention, making it possible for A to aliento be unanswerable. So obviously desirable ate or devise the property away from his or
has the eﬀectuation of intention become that her heirs.¹¹ A joint tenant has nothing to deit requires some eﬀort to recall that there are vise in the jointly owned property, no matter
3
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The lease of real property, historically characterized as the conveyance of a non-freehold estate, is also
dependent on intention, but the requisite intention is stereotypically indicated by the delivery of a
signed document. See 29 Broadway Corp. v. Alexander’s, Inc., 387 N.E. 2d 205 (N.Y. 979).
RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 38, p. 84 (2ⁿd ed. 955).
THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 62, p. 293 (2ⁿd ed. 953) (“no will is valid
unless there is compliance with all of the statutory requirements. The fact that the testator intended to
comply … is not ground for relaxing the rules.”). Many states recognize holographic (handwritten) wills
and a few, nuncupative (oral) wills; again, the statutory requirements must be strictly complied with.
P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 22 (979).
Matt. 20:5 (KJ).
The early common law has been described as “a primitive legal system which has a highly developed
land law, but no theory of contract.” 2 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 355
(4th ed. 936). See also John V. Orth, Contract and the Common Law, in THE STATE AND FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT 44, 45–49 (Harry N. Scheiber ed. 998). Without attention to contract with its insistence
on intention, it was easier to focus on hard-and-fast rules and ignore expectations.
Croker v. Marquis of Hertford, 4 Moo. P.C. 339, 369, 3 Eng. Rep. 334, 344–45 (P.C. 844) (Lushington,
Dr.). See S.M. WADDAMS, LAW, POLITICS AND THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND: THE CAREER OF STEPHEN
LUSHINGTON, 782–873 at 9–92 (992).
Perrin v. Blake,  Collectanea Juridica 309, 30 (K.B. 770) (Yates, J., dissenting). Sir William Holdsworth,
the great legal historian, described Yates’ dissent as “a complete answer to the view that, in construing
a will, only the intention of the testator must be regarded.” 2 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 484 (938).
See John V. Orth, The Mystery of the Rule in Shelley’s Case, 7 GREEN BAG 2D 45 (2003). See also John V.
Orth, Requiem for the Rule in Shelley’s Case, 67 N.C. L. REV. 68, 692 (989) (expressing the fervent hope
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is to defeat intention. Therefore every

how clearly expressed the intention.¹² Nor
provision in a will or settlement is to
are intentional restraints on alienation valid
be construed as if the Rule did not exist,
except in certain trusts.¹³ At one time mortand then to the provision so construed
main statutes empowered surviving spouses
the Rule is to be remorselessly applied.¹⁶
and children to set aside gifts to charity in
Rules of construction, unlike rules of law,
death-bed wills,¹⁴ and the ubiquitous statutes that today grant a surviving spouse an are supposed to eﬀectuate intention. By raiselective share in the estate of the deceased ing a rebuttable presumption that speciﬁc
partner are obviously intended to defeat an words and phrases have certain meanings,
intention to reduce or eliminate the survivor’s they reduce the likelihood of disputes and
share.¹⁵ The Rule Against Perpetuities, of increase the speed and eﬃciency of property
course, is the most celebrated check on inten- transactions. The Doctrine of Worthier Title,
tion, and its chief expounder, John Chipman where it still exists, raises a presumption that a
Gray, seemed to glory in the Rule’s intention- limitation in a deed, including a deed of trust,
creating a remainder in the grantor’s heirs is
defeating potential:
actually intended to leave a reversion in the
The Rule against Perpetuities is not a
grantor, giving the grantor power to alienate
rule of construction, but a peremptory
or
devise the property away from his or her
command of law. It is not, like a rule of
construction, a test, more or less artiﬁheirs.¹⁷ Ambiguous terms in conveyances are
cial, to determine intention. Its object
construed to avoid the possibility of forfei-

2
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7

that after the repeal of the Rule in North Carolina, the judges try to eﬀectuate intention and do not
simply “do the opposite of what they would have done under the Rule”).
See 4 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 53 (2th ed., O.W. Holmes, Jr., ed., 873) (“A
joint tenant has not an interest which is devisable” because “the survivor claims under the ﬁrst feoﬀor,
which is title paramount to that of the devisee.”). For a criticism of this rule and its rationale, see R.H.
Helmholz, Realism and Formalism in the Severance of Joint Tenancies, 77 NEB. L. REV. , 29–30 (998).
See Lewis M. Simes, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 3, p. 238 (2ⁿd ed. 966) (“all
disabling restraints are void” except “restraints on alienation incident to beneﬁcial interests in spendthrift trusts”).
For what appears to be the last remaining American mortmain statute, see GA. CODE § 53–2–0 (998).
For what may have been the next-to-last, see NEW YORK EST., POWERS  TRUSTS LAW § 5–3.3 (repealed 98). The earliest mortmain statutes required the donor to seek permission by statute or royal
license before land could be transferred to a corporation, usually at that time some arm of the Church.
For an historical survey, see SANDRA RABBAN, MORTMAIN LEGISLATION AND THE ENGLISH CHURCH,
279–500 (982). To this day, the bad name for intention that seeks to extend its reach too far is control
by the “dead hand” (mortmain).
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-436 (998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30–3.ﬀ. (2000). Elective share
statutes are found in all separate property states except Georgia. JESSE DUKEMINIER  STANLEY M.
JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 480  n.  (6th ed. 2000). In community property states
the spouses own all acquisitions from earnings after marriage in equal undivided shares. Only the state
of Louisiana, where the civil law rather than the common law forms the basis of the law of succession,
protects children in some circumstances from intentional disinheritance. LA. CONST. art. 2, § 5; LA.
CIV. CODE arts. 493–54.
JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 629, p. 599 (4th ed., Roland Gray ed.,
942). The Rule Against Perpetuities, in Gray’s classic formulation, is “NO INTEREST IS GOOD
UNLESS IT MUST VEST, IF AT ALL, NOT LATER THAN TWENTY-ONE YEARS
AFTER SOME LIFE IN BEING AT THE CREATION OF THE INTEREST.” Id. § 20, p. 9
(capitals in original). A simpler Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities has been adopted in
many states. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4–5 ﬀ. (995).
Although it began as a rule of law, the Doctrine of Worthier Title has, at least since Judge Benjamin
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ture; in consequence, restrictive covenants
are preferred to conditions subsequent, and
fees subject to conditions subsequent to determinable fees.¹⁸ Pretermission statutes are
designed to carry out the testator’s presumed
intention by providing for a neglected spouse
or child.¹⁹ The same may be said of so-called
anti-lapse statutes, substituting gifts to issue
for gifts to deceased family members,²⁰ and
statutes revoking testamentary gifts in favor
of divorced spouses.²¹
While rules of construction are intended
to eﬀectuate intention, they may in some cases actually defeat it. Not only are mistakes in
application possible, but the presumption in
favor of one construction over another will
resolve or preclude disputes in cases in which
evidence is lacking or inconclusive. There are,
in addition, rules of construction that, under
the guise of eﬀectuating intention, are in fact
designed to make it more diﬃcult to accomplish certain ends, permissible in themselves
but viewed as undesirable or unlikely to be

8
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the product of informed choice. The butcher’s (or, rather, the judge’s) thumb weighs
more heavily in some determinations of intention than in others. The strong presumption in favor of marketable title in contracts
for the sale of land means that an agreement
to convey land that is silent as to the title to
be conveyed, even an agreement to convey by
means of a quitclaim deed, is construed to be
an agreement to convey a full marketable fee
simple.²² Public policy in favor of an implied
warranty of habitability in the sale of residential real estate is so strong that for a waiver to
be eﬀective the contract of sale must explicitly refer to the “warranty of habitability” in
ipsissima verba.²³ The class-closing rule in the
law of trusts creates so powerful a presumption that the settlor would prefer a class to
close as soon as any member thereof can demand distribution that it has been confused
with a rule of law.²⁴ The presumption against
agreements among cotenants not to partition
means that an agreement to do “nothing to

Cardozo’s landmark opinion in Doctor v. Hughes, 22 N.E. 22 (N.Y. 99), been generally regarded as
a rule of construction, therefore rebuttable by evidence to the contrary. Not to be seen to interfere with
intention even to this limited extent, a number of states have abolished the Doctrine of Worthier Title.
See JESSE DUKEMINIER  STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 776 (6th ed. 2000)
(listing ten states).
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 45, comment m.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 732.30 (993) (pretermitted spouse); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 55:0 (974) (pretermitted child).
See, e.g., TEX. PROBATE CODE § 68 (997). Statutes such as this one do not actually prevent lapse; rather,
they substitute one gift for another under certain circumstances.
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 9, § 9 (997).
See Wallach v. Riverside Bank, 00 N.E. 50 (N.Y. 92). See also UNIFORM LAND TRANSFER ACT § 2–
304(d) (“adopting … the rule of Wallach”).
See Board of Managers v. Wilmette Partners, 760 N.E.2d 976 (Ill. 200) (holding waiver of “warranties
of ﬁtness for particular purpose and merchantability” insuﬃcient to waive implied warranty of habitability); VA. CODE ANN. § 55–70. (permitting waiver of warranties in the sale of new homes “only if
the words used to waive, modify or exclude such warranties are conspicuously … set forth on the face
of the contract in capital letters which are at least two points larger than the other type in the contract
and only if the words used to waive, modify or exclude the warranties state with speciﬁcity the warranty
or warranties that are being waived, modiﬁed or excluded … .”). In leases the implied warranty can often
not be waived at all. See Javins, Saunders, and Gross v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 07, 082 (D.C.
Cir. 970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42–42(b).
See Re Wernher’s Settlement Trusts, [96]  All Eng. Rep. p. 84. Expert observers have conceded that
the class closing rule is “adhered to more closely than any other rule of construction.” JESSE DUKEMINIER
 STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 778 (6th ed. 2000).
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defeat the common tenancy” may not be in- evant statute of descent.²⁹
Rules concerning the manifestation of leterpreted as intended to prohibit partition,²⁵
and the rule (usually statutory) in favor of gal intention have the eﬀect of making some
tenancy in common means that a grant to manifestations ﬁnal, “privileging,” to use a
two or more to hold “jointly” will not be con- modern expression, the intention of one
time over another or of one form of expresstrued to create a joint tenancy.²⁶
Legal words are presumed to be used with sion (usually certain types of writing) over
their legal meanings, which is just a speciﬁc others. Inter vivos gifts are irrevocable once
application of the general rule that where “completed,” and oral revocation of wills is
written words have what appears to be a plain not allowed. But the intention that originally
meaning, that meaning is to be preferred over supported the gift may have changed. In such
all others.²⁷ This seemingly simple rule may cases there is ordinarily no remedy – unless
have unintended consequences. A scrivener the donor reserved a power of revocation, as
may not translate the grantor’s intention into in a conditional gift or revocable trust, or
the right legal words. Instructed to draft a unless the law treats the act as inherently
deed conveying title in joint tenancy with revocable as, for example, a gift causa mortis.
right of survivorship, the drafter might ne- Nor is the discernment of intention simple.
glect, out of ignorance or inadvertence, to It is notorious that fact-ﬁnders, both judges
use the form of words necessary in the juris- and juries, are capable of manipulating rules
diction.²⁸ Legal words may be used in a will, concerning mental capacity, undue inﬂuence,
but the testator, if not the lawyer, may have and fraud to upset unpopular or unconvenunderstood them in another, less speciﬁc tional dispositions in wills, so much so that
sense. The word “heirs,” for example, may be one scholar has dismissed freedom of testathought to include relatives such as in-laws tion as no more than a “myth.”³⁰
and stepchildren not provided for in the relFormal requirements are meant to ensure
25
26

27

28

29
30

See Michalski v. Michalski, 42 A.2d 645 (N.J. 958) (reversing trial court’s ﬁnding that the agreement
did not prohibit partition but refusing to enforce it anyway because of “changed circumstances”).
See Mustain v. Gardner, 67 N.E. 779 (Ill. 903); In re Estate of Hillyer, 664 So.2d 36 (Fla. 995). See also
John V. Orth, Joint Tenancies in 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY: THOMAS EDITION § 3.06(d), pp.
20–2 (994). If two grantees are married to one another, there may be a presumption that they are to
hold as tenants by the entirety. This was the common law rule, see John V. Orth, Tenancies by the Entirety
in 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY: THOMAS EDITION § 33.06(a), pp. 02–04 (994), and it has been
adopted by statute in some states. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.5.0(b); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39–3.6(b).
Suﬀolk Business Ctr. v. Applied Digital Data, 58 N.E.2d 320, 322 (N.Y. 99) (construing a deed). See
also THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 46, p. 8 (2nd ed. 953) (“If the
testator employed a draftsman skilled in the use of technical words these must be given their technical
meaning.”). The practical eﬀect of the plain meaning rule is to exclude evidence of other possible meanings.
See n. 26, supra. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has observed that in that state “[t]o create a right of
survivorship the normal procedure is to employ the phrase [as] ‘joint tenants, with a right of survivorship, and not as tenants in common’.” In re Estate of Michael, 28 A.2d 338, 342 (Pa. 966) (italics in
original). In Michigan the same form of words has been held to create an estate for joint lives with
alternative contingent remainders in the survivor. Jones v. Green, 337 N.W.2d 85 (Mich. App. 983).
Cf. Mahoney v. Grainger, 86 N.E. 86 (Mass. 933) (rejecting proﬀer of evidence that testatrix understood “heirs” to mean her ﬁrst cousins, when she had a surviving aunt who was her actual heir under the
relevant statute).
Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235 (996) (examining cases on
undue inﬂuence and will formalities). There is a distinction between the intention that a transaction be
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that intention properly expressed is given ef- dozen states, provides:
fect,³¹ but they may operate in some cases to
Although a document … was not exdefeat intention. Although donative intent
ecuted in compliance with [the formalimay be established, a gift may nonetheless
ties required of wills], the document …
is treated as if it had been executed in
fail for want of delivery.³² Perhaps the most
compliance
… if the proponent of the
troubling cases concern attempted testamendocument
…
establishes by clear and
tary gifts: failure to satisfy certain formal
convincing
evidence
that the decedent
requirements, typically involving a writing,
intended the document … to constitute
signature, and witnesses, may result in the
… the decedent’s will … .³⁴
frustration of the obvious intention of a
person now deprived by death of the ability There exists some confusion about the exact
to cure the defect.³³ The remedy most com- nature of this provision. The UPC itself treats
monly proposed for the frustration of testa- the section as if it merely excused “harmless
mentary intent by failure to comply with the error,” but at least one court has described it
proper forms is simply to devolve upon legal as adopting a “doctrine of substantial comdecision-makers discretion to accept as wills pliance,”³⁵ while commentators generally
documents that do not in fact comply with admit that it confers on the courts a plenary
“dispensing power,” that is, the power to disthe statute.
As amended in 990, the Uniform Probate pense with the statutory requirements altoCode (UPC), in a section adopted in half a gether if necessary to eﬀectuate intention.³⁶

3

32
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eﬀective and intention with respect to the meaning of some of its terms, but in practice a fact-ﬁnder can
negate the substantive intent by failing to ﬁnd the operative intent.
In their classic analysis of the role of formal requirements in the law of testation, Gulliver and Tilson
identiﬁed ritual, evidentiary, and protective functions, while insisting that the forms “should not be
revered as ends in themselves, enthroning formality over frustrated intention.” Ashbel G. Gulliver 
Catherine J. Tilson, Classiﬁcation of Gratuitous Transfers, 5 YALE L. J. , 3, 5–3 (94). Frequent failure
to comply with formal requirements may indicate that the requirements are not congruent with common expectations.
Foster v. Reiss, 2 A.2d 553, 560 (N.J. 955) (gift causa mortis) (“Although the writing establishes her
donative intent at the time it was written, it does not fulﬁll the requirement of delivery of the property,
which is a separate and distinct requirement … .”).
The same dilemma arises in the law of inter vivos gifts when litigation over donative intent occurs after
the death of the donor.
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2–503 (harmless error).
In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 339, 343 (N.J. 99). Substantial compliance seems to require at least
some compliance or attempted compliance.
JESSE DUKEMINIER  STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 25–52, 259–6 (6th ed.
2000). Harmless error, as its name implies, seems to admit some error, however minor, in compliance;
a dispensing power, on the other hand, suggests no need to comply (or attempt to comply) at all. To
the historically minded, there is something more than a little odd in the candid recognition of a judicial
power to “dispense” with the requirements of a statute. The King of England’s claim to such a power in
the seventeenth century precipitated a constitutional crisis, and in response the English Bill of Rights
speciﬁcally forbade the practice.  W.  M., st. 2, ch. 2, § I, clauses –2 (689). The threat still seemed real
enough a century later so that the generation that made the American Revolution included in several
state constitutions an express prohibition against “the power of suspending laws, or the execution of
laws, by any authority, without consent of the representatives of the people.” See, e.g., N.C. CONST. of
776, Declaration of Rights § 5. Indeed, it is still there in some constitutions today. N.C. CONST. art. I,
§ 7 (same). Where the UPC section conferring the dispensing power is adopted by statute rather than
judicial ﬁat, the constitutional requirement of the “consent of the representatives of the people” would
seem to be satisﬁed.
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Thus does intention trump form; or, more typewritten “will” had been “republished” by
precisely, thus does the judicial determina- the handwritten “codicil.”⁴⁰
Associate Justice Nelson S. Corn contion of intention trump the legislative prescription of form.
curred in the result and authored a precoA troubling illustration of the problem is cious statement of the doctrine of substanprovided in Johnson v. Johnson, a 954 wills tial compliance: “It was not the intent of our
case from Oklahoma.³⁷ Dexter Johnson, law-makers, in enacting these statutes, if
himself a lawyer who had prepared many substantially complied with, to ever allow a
wills in proper form for his clients, left at his miscarriage of justice by a wrongful disposideath a typed document appearing to be his tion of the testator’s property contrary to his
own will but neither signed nor witnessed.³⁸ intent.”⁴¹ Not interested in technical subtleAt its foot appeared a handwritten and ties, Justice Corn would have held simply that
signed statement leaving a nominal gift to “[i]n the instant case, the intent expressed by
his brother and reciting the seemingly obvi- the testator … is clear and beyond any quesous fact that “[t]his will shall be complete un- tion.”⁴² One might applaud the justice’s opinless hereafter altered, changed or rewritten.”³⁹ ion as the triumph of substance over form if
Devisavit vel non? Local law permitted holo- the evidence was as unequivocal as he said it
graphic wills and codicils, so the handwrit- was – and if the justice himself had not been
ten part could be probated, assuming testa- one of America’s most corrupt judges!⁴³
mentary intent was found. But what of the
Students and commentators alike too
typewritten part? The lower courts rejected often assume that the choice is between a
the entire document, but the Oklahoma regime of rules with the potential to defeat
Supreme Court reversed in a confused opin- intention and the simple eﬀectuation of inion relying largely on the argument that the tention without regard to rules. In fact, the
37 279 P.2d 928 (Okla. 954).
38 No lawyer who has ever supervised the elaborate ceremony of executing a written attested will could
possibly think that he had executed his own will without signature or witnesses. For the recommended
method of executing a will, see  A. JAMES CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING § 3.. (6th ed. 998 with Jeﬀrey
N. Pennell).
39 279 P.2d at 933 (photocopy of original document). As every lawyer knows, wills are inherently revocable
and ambulatory. THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § , p. 2 (2ⁿd ed. 953).
40 “Publication” of a will is deﬁned as “the signiﬁcation by the testator to the witnesses that the instrument
is his will.” THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 68, p. 327 (2ⁿd ed. 953). Since
the typewritten part had never been “published” in the ﬁrst place, it necessarily follows that it cannot
have been “republished.” It is at least arguable that the handwritten part was not a holographic codicil
but a holographic will that incorporated the typewritten part by reference.
4 279 P.2d at 932 (Corn, J., concurring).
42 Id. The evidence did not seem so clear to the judges of the district and county courts or to the three
Supreme Court justices who dissented in the case.
43 See Johnson v. Johnson, 424 P.2d 44, 46 (Okla. 967) (describing bribe-taking by Justice Corn over
more than twenty years but ﬁnding no evidence that bribery inﬂuenced the decision in this particular
case). Justice Corn’s defense of judicial discretion unfortunately brings to mind a famous outburst by
Lord Camden, himself a distinguished judge:
the discretion of a Judge is the law of tyrants; it is always unknown; it is diﬀerent in diﬀerent
men; it is casual, and depends upon constitution, temper, and passion. In the best it is often times
caprice, in the worst it is every vice, folly, and passion to which human nature is liable.
Doe v. Kersey (C.P. 765), quoted in 2 JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE
GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 356 (992). A more sinister example can
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choice is between rules to guide decisionmakers and entrusting them with still more
discretion. Granting judges the authority to
accept less than the prescribed formalities
in the law of wills, while perhaps reducing
the likelihood of intention-defeating decisions, will also have the necessary consequence of requiring extensive fact-ﬁnding in
many cases that do not eventually result in
the “clear and convincing” establishment of
the decedent’s intention.⁴⁴ And – in light
of the evidence that fact-ﬁnders already

manipulate the rules in order to defeat substantive dispositions – it will only increase
the opportunity for abuse. Without ﬁdelity
to rules to use as a standard by which to
review judicial performance, judges may escape eﬀective oversight: faulting “judgment
calls” is far more diﬃcult than detecting
lapses in the application of rules. In the end,
the commendable intention to eﬀectuate
intention may instead lead only to consequences that are as unfortunate as they are
unintended.

hardly be imagined than the fate of the German “free law movement” (Freirechtsbewegung). Founded
by well-meaning academics Eugen Ehrlich and Hermann Kantorowicz in the early twentieth century,
it was a reaction against an excessively strict application of the German Civil Code, such as the invalidation of a will that was not “subscribed” because signed on the same line as the date. Kantorowicz
recommended that in such a case a judge ought to be free to reach a result in keeping with social values.
Unfortunately during the Nazi era the idea of departing from the language of the Code in favor of the
“spirit of the law” was taken to horrifying extremes. See J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN
LEGAL THEORY 359–6 (992).
44 Judges actually prefer to work with rules, both to ensure fairness and to economize their time and eﬀort,
and in the absence of rules generate them spontaneously. In certain Australian states that have given
judges a dispensing power, the cases have “produced a ranking of the Wills Act formalities … , devaluing attestation while insisting on signature and writing.” John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in
the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. ,
52–54 (987). In other words, the judges have simply amended the Wills Act.
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